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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
OPHELIA BUFORD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 900444-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 
1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling 
that under the totality of the circumstances the affidavit 
established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. 
Because the trial court is in the best position to assess witness 
credibility in a motion to suppress hearing, this Court "will not 
disturb its factual assessment underlying a decision to . . . 
deny a suppression motion unless it clearly appears that the 
lower court was in error." State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285 
i i 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Moreover, when a search warrant is 
challenged as having been issued without an adequate showing of 
probable cause, the reviewing court does not conduct a de novo 
review of the magistrate's probable cause determinaion; instead, 
the reviewing court determines only whether the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. 
State v, Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989)- The reviewing 
court should pay "great deference" to the magistrate's decision. 
Ibid. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ophelia Buford, was charged with possession 
of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1990) (Record 
[hereinafter R.] at 6 J.1 She was subsequently convicted as 
charged following a jury trial held June 7-8, 1990 (R. at 160). 
On July 9, 1990 the trial court sentenced defendant to not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison (R. at 200). 
1
 Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence against 
her prior to trial on April 13, 1989 (R. at 43, a copy of 
defendant's motion is attached hereto as Addendum C). Following 
a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied defendant's 
motion (R. at 86-91). The trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law denying defendant's motion to suppress were 
subsequently amended at a hearing on defendant's certificate of 
probable cause held July 16, 1990 (R. at 210). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Working undercover on the evening of January 3, 1989, 
Officer Zane D. Smith of the Salt Lake City Police Department,2 
approached Yolanda Rodriguez in the vicinity of 750 West North 
Temple, and asked her to assist him in purchasing narcotics 
(Transcript of jury trial, June 8, 1990 [hereinafter T2.] at 38, 
46-47; Transcript of motion to suppress hearing, July 14, 1989 
[hereinafter Ml.] at 8-9; Transcript of motion to suppress 
hearing, August 22, 1989 [hereinafter M2.] at 3). As a result of 
that conversation, Rodriguez directed Officer Smith to drive to 
defendant Ophelia Buford's residence located at 474 North Grant 
Street (T2. at 38, 47-48; Ml. at 9; M2. at 42). Rodriguez then 
entered defendant's residence and purchased cocaine with cash 
provided to her by Officer Smith (T2. at 38, 48; Ml. at 9-10; M2. 
at 16). After the buy, Officer Smith returned Rodriguez to their 
original meeting place and made arrangements to meet her again 
later that evening, in the event he desired to purchase more 
cocaine (T2. at 49; Ml. at 49; M2. at 8). Officer Smith then 
returned to MNTF Offices where he spoke with detectives there 
about the possibility of using Rodriguez as an informant3 (M2. at 
2
 In January of 1989, Officer Smith was on assignment to the 
Metropolitan Narcotics Task Force (MNTF) (T2. at 37; Ml. at 8). 
3
 Officer Smith had not dealt with Rodriguez on any prior 
investigation and met her for the first time on the evening of 
January 3, 1989 when he asked for her assistance in obtaining 
narcotics (M2. at 3-4). Upon returning to MNTF Offices that 
night, Officer Smith learned more about Rodriguez from detectives 
there who informed him about her prior criminal history and the 
fact that she frequented the area of North Temple where he had 
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8-10). At approximately 10:00 p.m. that same evening, Officer 
Smith, accompanied by two additional undercover detectives, 
returned to the vicinity of North Temple where he had previously 
arranged to meet Rodriguez and arrested her for the earlier 
transaction (T2. at 39, 50; Ml. at 10-11; M2. at 10-11). 
Upon being arrested Rodriguez was taken to MNTF Offices 
where Officer Smith discussed with her the possibility of making 
a controlled buy (M2. at 11). In exchange for Rodriguez's 
cooperation, Officer Smith offered to negotiate with the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office for a reduction in the charges 
pending against her (T2. at 50; M2. at 11-12).4 Rodriguez agreed 
to make the buy and to wear a wire (M2. at 11). 
As part of her cooperative effort, Rodriguez informed 
Officer Smith that she frequently purchased drugs from defendant 
who held sufficient quantities to transact sales any time of the 
day or night and that "drug usage and sales were commonplace" at 
defendant's residence (T2. at 38; Ml. at 11-12; M2. at 16-18, 42, 
45).3 Rodriguez further informed Officer Smith that she had 
made the initial contact (M2. at 3-4, 8-11). Although Officer 
Smith observed that Rodriguez was a likely user of narcotics, she 
did not appear to him to be under the influence of drugs at the 
time of his initial contact with her (M2. at 5). 
A
 Apparently, as a result of Rodriguez's cooperation in 
attempting the controlled buy, no charges were ultimately filed 
against her (M2. at 13-15). 
5
 At the motion to suppress hearing, Officer Smith initially 
recalled that Rodriguez had told him that the earlier transaction 
had taken place between herself and Bobby Roots (M2. at 16, 41). 
However, upon reviewing his initial report, as well as his 
affidavit in support of the search warrant, Officer Smith 
clarified his testimony at the suppression hearing, stating that 
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observed a "black revolver style handgun" inside defendant's 
residence within the last 72 hours (Ml. at 11; M2. at 19-20). In 
addition, Rodriguez provided Officer Smith with information about 
defendant and individuals she had observed at defendant's 
I 
residence, as well as certain persons both Rodriguez and Officer 
Smith had had dealings with in some prior and on-going 
investigations (Ml. at 11-12; M2. at 47, 52). Specifically, 
Rodriguez identified defendant by name and said that she had 
observed drug transactions inside defendant's residence (Ml. at 
11-12; M2. at 47, 52). When questioned by Officer Smith, other 
MNTF detectives were able to corroborate Rodriguez's information 
(Ml. at 13-15; M2. at 47, 50-57, 65). 
In preparation for the controlled buy, Rodriguez was 
apparently searched by Officer Raelyn Oman, in an effort to 
prevent contraband from being carried inside defendant's 
residence6 (Transcript of jury trial, June 7, 1990 [hereinafter 
the information in the affidavit that the first purchase had been 
transacted by defendant was more correct than his independent 
recollection (M2. at 17-18, 43, 50). At trial, Officer Smith 
reiterated that Rodriguez had informed him that both defendant 
and Bobby Roots were present and that the earlier purchase of 
cocaine had been transacted by defendant (T2. at 52-53, 58-59, 
67). 
6
 Although Rodriguez admitted to being searched prior to 
attempting the controlled buy, she alleged that Officer Smith 
allowed her to take a syringe inside defendant's residence 
(Transcript of motion to suppress hearing, August 23, 1989 
[hereinafter M3.] at 35). Officer Smith, on the other hand, 
testified that he did not give Rodriguez a syringe prior to her 
entering defendant's residence for the purpose of attempting the 
controlled buy, nor, to his knowledge, was Rodriguez allowed to 
take any contraband or paraphernalia inside defendant's residence 
at that time (T2. at 60; M2. at 23). 
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Tl.] at 128; T2. at 51; Ml. at 18, 41). Rodriguez was also 
fitted with a wire to allow MNTF detectives to monitor the buy 
(T2. at 40; M2. at 21-22). Officer Smith provided Rodriguez with 
two one hundred dollar bills from the MNTF "buy fund" which had 
previously been photocopied and the serial numbers recorded (Tl. 
at 129-30; T2. at 39; Ml. at 19; M2. at 7). 
Accompanied by approximately three MNTF detectives, 
Officer Smith drove Rodriguez to the vicinity of defendant's 
residence at approximately 1:30 a.m. on January 4, 1989 (Tl. at 
132; T2. at 40). While detectives monitored her activities both 
visually and electronically, Rodriguez approached and entered 
defendant's residence (Tl. at 132-34; T2. at 40; M2. at 22). 
Once Rodriguez was inside, Officer Smith heard her converse with 
a male voice, apparently that of Bobby Roots (M2. at 22). 
Rodriguez indicated that she wished to purchase an "eight ball" 
or an eighth ounce of cocaine (M2. at 23). Apparently, Roots 
then began to harass Rodriguez, who asked for help from 
detectives monitoring the buy approximately four times (T2. at 
41; M2. at 25). Several detectives then entered defendant's 
residence in order to secure the scene and protect Rodriguez (T2. 
at 41; M2. at 28). Based on information from Rodriguez that 
drugs were commonly sold from an upstairs bedroom, Officer Smith 
and approximately two other detectives immediately proceeded to 
that area of defendant's residence (T2. at 42; M2. at 32-33). 
Upon entering an upstairs bedroom, detectives observed 
approximately six individuals, including defendant, but not 
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Rodriguez (Tl. at 135-37; M2. at 36). Leaving Detective Morgan 
Sayes to secure the upstairs bedroom, Officer Smith and the 
remaining detective continued looking for Rodriguez on the main 
floor where they discovered her barricaded inside the bathroom 
(Tl. at 138; T2. at 42; M2. at 33-34). Upon entering the 
bathroom, the detectives observed a syringe and noted that 
Rodriguez appeared frantic, upset and frightened (M2. at 34). 
Roots was located shortly thereafter in the basement of 
defendant's residence, hidina under a sofa bed (Tl. at 140; T2. 
at 44). 
Once Rodriguez had been located and the other occupants 
of defendant's residence were secured, Officer Smith directed the 
remaining officers to secure defendant's residence until a search 
warrant could be obtained (Ml. at 32). Specifically, Officer 
Smith directed that nothing was to be searched or moved until the 
search warrant was present on the scene7 (Ml. at 32). Officer 
Smith then headed back to MNTF Offices to assist in the final 
preparations of his affidavit (Ml. at 33). 
Based on his earlier interview with Rodriguez and the 
corroborating information that defendant did in fact live at the 
i I 
7
 Officer Smith testified that although he did observe drug 
paraphernalia in plain view on a night stand in the upstairs 
bedroom upon his initial entry, he did not specifically recall 
seeing an eighth ounce of cocaine on the nightstand (M2. at 36-
40). However, prior to his leaving to obtain the search warrant, 
Officer Smith was informed by detectives helping to secure the 
premises that there was cocaine, apparently in plain view, on the 
nightstand in the upstairs bedroom (M2. at 36-40). 
Detective Sayes testified that no search was conducted 
prior to the arrival of the search warrant (Tl. at 141). 
-7-
Grant Street address, Officer Smith had begun preparation of the 
affidavit prior to the attempted controlled buy (T2. at 38; M2. 
at 42, 45). Apparently, MNTF detectives were still in the 
process of gathering information and preparing the affidavit at 
the time of the attempted buy (Ml. at 17; M2. at 13-15, 50; R. at 
174-78, a copy of the affidavit is attached hereto as addendum 
A). When Officer Smith returned to MNTF Offices he prepared an 
addendum explaining the exigent manner of entry which had^ 
interrupted the completion of the controlled buy discussed in his 
affidavit (Ml. at 33; R. at 178, see addendum A). Relying upon 
information provided by his fellow officers, as well as 
Rodriguez, for matters outside his personal knowledge, Officer 
Smith then reviewed the affidavit carefully for accuracy before 
signing and presenting it to the magistrate for authorization of 
a search warrant (T2. at 53; M2. at 55-57).8 The subsequent 
search of defendant's residence turned up various amounts of 
cocaine and other drug paraphernalia, as well as the controlled 
buy money (Tl. at 124-30, 150-59, 162-65, 172; T2. at 45; M2. at 
28). 
In a pretrial motion to suppress, defendant sought to 
suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant (R. at 
43, see Addendum C). In support of her motion defendant merely 
asserted that the evidence had been seized in violation of her 
"State and Federal Constitutional Right to be free from 
8
 At the motion to suppress hearing, Officer Smith testified 
that the affidavit included no statement that was willfully false 
or reckless (M2. at 55-56). 
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unreasonable searches and seizures, Fourth Amendment U.S. 
Constitution, Article I Section 14 Utah State Constitution" (R. 
at 43). At a hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant argued 
that false statements in the affidavit negated any finding of 
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant (M3. at 58, 
69). The trial court denied defendant's motion, specifically 
concluding that 
[u]nder the totality of the circumstances, 
the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant constituted probable cause to justify 
its issuance, and even if the source of the 
cocaine was erroneously identified, the error 
was neither willfully represented or made 
with reckless disregard for the truth, and 
the remainder of the affidavit amply supports 
the finding of probable cause. 
(R. at 213, a copy of the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress is attached hereto as Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant 
because Officer Smith's supporting affidavit provided the 
magistrate with a substantial basis for a finding of probable 
cause. Although the affidavit contains false statements 
pertaining to an attempted controlled buy of cocaine from inside 
defendant's residence, those statements were effectively excised 
before the magistrate's determination of probable cause by the 
affiant's addendum notifying the magistrate that the buy had not 
been completed due to exigent circumstances. Moreover, the 
-9-
unexcised portions of the affidavit referring to the informant's 
unwitting purchase of cocaine from inside defendant's residence, 
as well as the corroborating information concerning defendant's 
prior involvement in the possession and distribution of 
controlled substances, amply support a finding of probable cause 
for the issuance of a search warrant for defendant's residence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH 
WARRANT FOR DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE PROVIDES A 
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR A FINDING OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE. 
Defendant asserts that Officer Smith's affidavit in 
support of the search warrant issued for her residence contained 
false statements and that material information was omitted (Br. 
of App. at 15-16). She further asserts that the alleged false 
statements and omissions were material and were made either 
intentionally or recklessly in violation of both the federal and 
state constitutions, and thus, the affidavit failed to establish 
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant (Br. of App. 
at 13-17, 26). Defendant's broad allegations and conclusory 
analysis are insufficient to establish that information contained 
in the affidavit was misleading or that material information was 
omitted; therefore, her assertions of misrepresentation are 
without merit. Moreover, the affidavit provides a substantial 
basis for a finding of probable cause. 
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It is well established that the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution9 both require a finding 
of "probable cause supported by oath or affirmation" for the 
issuance of a search warrant. State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing U.S. Const, amend. IV, Utah Const, 
art. I, section 14, and State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)). It is 
equally clear that whether an affidavit in support of a search 
warrant establishes probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant is determined by the totality of the circumstances. 
State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and State v. Anderton, 
668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983) (adopting Gates analysis)), cert. 
denied, 713 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). Several factors are considered 
under the totality of the circumstances, including "the veracity, 
reliability, and basis of knowledge" of informants. Brown, 798 
P.2d at 286; Avala, 762 P.2d at 1107 (citation omitted). As 
noted by this Court in Avala, the weight accorded these factors 
9
 The State makes no argument concerning the validity of 
defendant's request for a separate state constitutional analysis 
of her various claims (Br. of App. at 26-36) as these issues were 
not properly preserved in the trial court. Although defendant 
filed a motion to suppress evidence allegedly seized in violation 
of both the federal and state constitutions, she made only 
nominal reference to the state constitution and failed to 
articulate any separate state constitutional grounds in support 
of her argument (R. at 43; M3. at 69, see Addendum C). 
Therefore, this Court should not engage in a separate state 
constitutional analysis of defendant's allegations. State v. 
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting that "the 
proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis 
of state constitutional interpretation is before the trial 
court") (citation omitted). 
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varies according to the circumstances of each case. .Id. at 1109-
10 (citing State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984)). Thus in 
determining whether the issuing magistrate reached a practical, 
common sense decision that there is "probable cause to believe 
that evidence is located in a particular place," the reviewing 
court does not conduct a "de novo probable-cause determination;" 
rather, the reviewing court determines "whether the evidence 
viewed as a whole" provides a "'substantial basis' for the^  
finding of probable cause." JDd. (citing Massachusetts v. Upton, 
466 U.S. 727, 732-733 (1984)); Brown, 798 P.2d at 286 (citing 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 
1987), and State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)). In so determining, the reviewing court should pay "great 
deference to the magistrate's decision. State v. Babbell, 770 
P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989). A review of Officer Smith's affidavit 
reveals a "substantial basis" for the determination of probable 
cause and thus the magistrate's issuance of a search warrant for 
defendant's residence. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
Defendant asserts, in part, that Officer Smith's 
affidavit is misleading because it describes Rodriguez as a 
reliable informant (Br. of App. at 16). Contrary to defendant's 
assertion, Officer Smith's affidavit set forth sufficient facts 
from which the magistrate could reasonably determine that 
Rodriguez was a reliable informant (R. at 175-78, see Addendum 
A). While false statements in a probable cause affidavit can, in 
-12-
some circumstances, invalidate a warrant issued in reliance 
thereon, the party challenging an affidavit on those grounds must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence both that the 
statements were false and that any falsity was included 
knowingly, intentionally or recklessly. Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190-91 
(Utah 1986)(following Franks and extending that reasoning to 
misstatements by reason of omission), cert, denied/ 480 U.J3. 930 
(1987); Miller, 740 P.2d at 1366; Brown, 798 P.2d at 288. 
Moreover, "[t]here must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or 
of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must 
be accompanied by an offer of proof." Miller, 740 P.2d at 1367 
(citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). Defendant has not and cannot 
meet this burden in the present case. 
With no discussion of facts actually set forth in 
Officer Smith's affidavit indicating that Rodriguez was reliable, 
defendant broadly asserts that Officer Smith's characterization 
of Rodriguez as a "reliable informant" is misleading because the 
affidavit fails to indicate that (1) "neither he nor other 
officers had met or used" Rodriguez prior to this incident or 
that (2) Rodriguez was "a prostitute and drug addict" (Br. of 
App. at 16). Defendant further asserts that Officer Smith's 
affidavit did not state that Rodriguez had been arrested for her 
unwitting purchase of cocaine or that Rodriguez was "told that 
-13-
the officers would ask the prosecutor to dismiss the case if she 
cooperated" (Br. of App. at 16).10 
Admittedly, an informant's reliability may, in some 
cases, be established by an affidavit indicating that the 
informant has previously given truthful information to the police 
concerning the existence of contraband. Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206 
(Utah 1984) (citing McCrav v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967)). 
This method is often necessary and is frequently used where the 
informant must remain confidential. .Id. (affidavit supported 
anonymous informant's veracity where it set forth prior history 
of reliable information); Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130 (demonstrating 
that confidential informant had previously given police truthful 
10
 At the outset of the State's analysis, it is helpful to 
clarify the record before this Court. First, although defendant 
asserts that none of the MNTF detectives "had met or used" 
Rodriguez prior to this incident, Officer Smith testified that 
after he returned from the unwitting buy, he described Rodriguez 
to MNTF detectives and that Officer Rob DeWitt suggested that the 
individual described was Rodriguez (M2. at 8-11). See note 3, 
supra. 
Second, while defendant concedes that Rodriguez was 
arrested for her unwitting purchase of cocaine from defendant's 
residence, her assertion that Rodriguez was "told the officers 
would ask the prosecutor to dismiss the case if she cooperated," 
conflicts with Officer Smith's testimony (Br. of App. at 16). At 
the motion to suppress hearing, Rodriguez testified that Officer 
Smith never arrested her and that she was simply taken to the 
MNTF Office and asked to make a controlled buy (M3. at 69). 
Rodriguez testified that, in exchange for her cooperation, she 
was promised that she would not be arrested or charged for her 
participation in the unwitting buy (M3. at 69). Officer Smith, 
on the other hand, testified that Rodriguez was in fact arrested, 
after which he discussed with her the possibility of making a 
controlled buy (M2. at 11). In exchange for Rodriguez's 
cooperation, Officer Smith offered to negotiate with the county 
attorney for a reduction in the charges pending against her (T2. 
at 50; M2. at 11-12). Rodriguez then agreed to make the buy and 
to wear a wire (M2. at 11). 
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information found to be an accepted method for establishing 
veracity). A prior history of reliability is not, however, the 
exclusive method for establishing an informant's reliability, 
particularly where, as here, the informant's identity is known. 
Id. (noting that it is not "required that an affidavit be so 
specific as to detail every prior occasion in which an 
informant's seed yielded fruit"). Other criteria have been 
appropriately considered to enhance the reliability of a 
particular informant including, but not limited to, the personal 
observations of an informant, the detail of those observations, 
and verification of the information through independent police 
investigation. State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (named informant personally observed the events she 
reported and police independently attempted to verify her 
reliability), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Brown, 798 
P.2d at 286-87 (known informant had personal knowledge of 
information he supplied to police which was described in detail 
and independently verified); Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206 
(reliability "boosted" by the detail in which anonymous informant 
described his personal observations); Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130 
(reliability enhanced by confidential informant's personal 
observation of contraband); Anderton, 668 P.2d at 1260 
(confidential informant personally observed contraband). 
In the present case, Officer Smith's affidavit states 
that Rodriguez had been inside defendant's residence to make 
purchases of cocaine, and that she had observed drug 
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paraphernalia inside defendant's residence, including scales, 
vials, pipes, razor blades and paper bindles as well as other 
evidence of drug possession and distribution11 (R. at 175, see 
Addendum A)• Specifically, the affidavit further states that 
Rodriguez had purchased cocaine from defendant's residence on 
behalf of Officer Smith (who was working undercover at the time), 
within the previous eight hours (R. at 175, see Addendum A). 
With reference to Rodriguez's unwitting purchase of cocaioe, the 
affidavit indicates that Rodriguez first directed Officer Smith 
to defendant's residence and then entered and returned in less 
than a minute with the cocaine he had asked her to.purchase (R. 
at 175, see Addendum A). 
After her subsequent arrest for the unwitting buy, 
Rodriguez informed Officer Smith that that buy had been 
transacted by defendant. While the fact of Rodriguez's arrest is 
not expressly mentioned in the affidavit, it does state that 
Officer Smith was able to independently verify that defendant 
lived at the Grant Street address, and that defendant had a prior 
criminal history of illegal drug use and sale and was then on 
11
 At the motion to suppress hearing, Rodriguez testified 
that she had observed drug paraphernalia within the two weeks 
prior to the issuance of the warrant (M3. at 45). See Brown, 798 
P.2d at 287 (noting that an affidavit need not set forth a 
specific reference to the time of the informant's observation in 
order for warrant to be valid, particularly where the affidavit 
recites facts indicating activity of a [protacted] and continuous 
nature); Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57 (noting that while informant 
had not been in the defendant's home in the two months prior to 
issuance of the warrant, the "mere passage of time does not 
necessarily invalidate the supporting basis for the warrant") 
(citing Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131). 
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probation for possession and distribution of narcotics (R. at 
175-76, see Addendum A). The affidavit also reflects Rodriguez's 
subsequent unsuccessful attempt to make a controlled buy of 
cocaine from defendant's residence (R. at 175-76, see Addendum 
A). 
While the affidavit does not explicitly state that 
Rodriguez was a drug addict and prostitute, or that she 
cooperated in the controlled buy in exchange for a possible 
reduction in the charges pending against her, defendant has not 
demonstrated that the exclusion of the above information was 
misleading. Miller, 740 P.2d at 1367 (citation omitted). Nor 
has she demonstrated how inclusion of that information could 
negate the magistrate's finding of probable cause. Because there 
is a "substantial basis" in the affidavit upon which the 
magistrate could reasonably find Rodriguez was reliable, even if 
the above information had been expressly included, defendant's 
argument lacks merit. 
Defendant's remaining claims of misrepresentation are 
equally without merit as is demonstrated by a review of the 
circumstances surrounding the preparation of Officer Smith's 
affidavit. Based on information gleaned from Rodriguez, as well 
as Officer Smith's own observations, MNTF detectives decided to 
attempt a controlled buy at defendant's residence and began 
putting together an affidavit in support of a search warrant. 
The affidavit was partially prepared prior to the attempted 
controlled buy and, as a result, the affidavit anticipated 
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certain facts which ultimately did not occur. Thus, after the 
controlled buy was interrupted, and before presenting the 
affidavit to the magistrate, Officer Smith attached an 
explanatory addendum notifying the magistrate that the controlled 
buy discussed in his affidavit had not been completed (R. at 177, 
see Addendum A). 
Notwithstanding the above, on appeal to this Court, 
defendant points to approximately six false statements in'officer 
Smith's affidavit all relating in one way or another to the fact 
that the controlled buy was not completed.12 However, contrary 
12
 According to defendant, Officer Smith's affidavit 
contains the following false statements: 
1. The statement in paragraph 7 on page two 
that "RI told your affiant that each buy of 
cocaine was made from Fifi . . . " 
2. The statement in paragraph 5 on page two 
that a controlled buy was made within the 
past eight hours, as well as all statements 
relating to that controlled buy. 
Statements relating to the controlled buy are 
as follows: 
a. The RI was searched after the controlled 
buy (paragraph 6). 
b. "RI was found in possession of cocaine 
after the buy and did not have the Metro Buy 
Money." (paragraph 6) 
c. "Affiant believes that the Metro buy 
money listed [sic] this warrant/affidavit 
will still be on the premises. (paragraph 9 
on page three). 
d. Information that the controlled buy was 
made from "Fifi." 
(Br. of App. at 15-16). 
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to defendant's apparent assertion, when "viewed in its entirety 
and in a common-sense fashion," Officer Smith's affidavit is 
neither false nor misleading. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 
1102 (Utah 1985); Brown, 798 P.2d at 287. 
Although preparation of probable cause affidavits or 
the issuance of search warrants prior to the occurrence of events 
described in the affidavit is not generally condoned, the Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized that pre-preparation may be * 
necessary in certain "special circumstances." State v. Slowe, 
728 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1985). Thus, prior to signing a pre-
prepared affidavit before a magistrate, it is required that the 
affiant verify that the facts alleged are true. JEd. at 111-12. 
That is essentially what happened in the present case. 
Admittedly, Officer Smith's affidavit contains false 
statements pertaining to the completion of the controlled buy; 
however, those statements were effectively excised before the 
magistrate made his determination of probable cause by Officer 
Smith's addendum. Moreover, the remaining, unexcised portions of 
the affidavit amply support a finding of probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant for defendant's residence (see 
Addendum A). 
As noted above, part of the information contained in 
the affidavit was supplied to Officer Smith by Rodriguez, who 
Officer Smith considered a reliable informant, as well as several 
MNTF detectives. As stated in the affidavit, Rodriguez informed 
Officer Smith that cocaine was being sold from defendant's 
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residence, that she had previously been inside defendant's 
residence to purchase cocaine, and that she had observed drug 
paraphernalia inside defendant's residence (R, at 175, see 
Addendum A). The affidavit further reflects the fact that 
Rodriguez informed Officer Smith that her unwitting purchase of 
cocaine on his behalf had been transacted by defendant (R. at 
175, see Addendum A). 
Officer Smith included his own observations in the 
0 
affidavit, stating that Rodriguez had directed him to defendant's 
residence (which address is clearly stated in the affidavit) for 
the purpose of purchasing cocaine, and that Rodriguez entered 
defendant's residence and returned in less than a minute with the 
cocaine he had requested her to purchase (R. at 175-76, see 
Addendum A)• He further noted that the unwitting transaction had 
occurred within the previous eight hours (R. at 175, see Addendum 
A). 
Officer Smith also included corroborative information 
obtained from his fellow MNTF detectives including defendant's 
identity and her involvement in the illegal sale of narcotics (R. 
at 175-76, see Addendum A). Significantly, Officer Smith 
included information that defendant was currently on probation 
for the illegal possession and distribution of narcotics (R. at 
176, see Addendum A). See Stromberq, 783 P.2d at 57 (probable 
cause determination supported by information that defendant had 
previously been convicted of a similar offense and that the 
activity described was continuous); Baileyf 675 P.2d at 1206 
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(verification of suspect's prior police record supported veracity 
and reliability of informant). Based on the foregoing 
information and Smith's explanatory addendum, any remaining 
discrepancies in the affidavit were minor and simply fail to 
undermine the essential truth of the allegations or rise to the 
level of knowing, intentional, or reckless misstatements. Slowe, 
728 P.2d at 111 (citation omitted). Because the affidavit 
provides a substantial basis for the magistrate's determination 
of probable cause,13 this Court should affirm the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this l^day of June, 1991. 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Utato Attorney General 
y/'aM&A. £ b 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
13
 In Point IV of her brief, defendant argues that "'good 
faith' does not save the warrant under either the Utah or United 
States Constitution" (Br. of App. at 37-41). However, because 
Officer Smith's affidavit provides ample support for the 
magistrate's finding of probable cause for the issuance of a 
search warrant for defendant's residence, the State does not rely 
upon, nor make any argument concerning, the good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
HAH Z-AJ)'KT 'A 
IN Till' THIRD COURT 
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY UtMI OF UTAH 
SI Ml" Of (I'I All ) 
• s s 
County of ' j a l t Ldkc ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: TYRONE MEDLEY __ .
 m m _ _ , M 7 0 Sou th R ^ y n n ^ IM . Wocr y f l n « y 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned a f f i an t t t i n ^ I J iv , deposes arid says ; 
That h e / ^ S ^ h a s reason to be l i eve 
That , ,- ,4 on the person (s) oi OPHELIA BUFORD , 7 / 1 6 / 2 9 , Female Black 
f ) i n tb° c h i c l e (s) described as _ 
1 on the premises known as 474 N o r t h 740 T J e s t . S a l t Lake C i t v 
a v h i t e i n c o l o r d u p l e x on t h e e a s t s i d e of t h e goad f a c -
ig West
 9 f he j " f on t h e S o u t h s i d e . 
In l he CLiy of S a l t Lake , County of Salt, Lake, Sijf p I Utah, there 
now c e r t a i n property of evidence described a s : 
SEE ATTACKMr. 
and that sa id property or ev idence: 
Qf$ was unlawfully acquired or Is unlawfully possessed ; 
Qt% has been used to commit or conceal a pub l i c of fense ; 
£ $ i s being possessed with the purpose to use i t as a means of 
committing or conceal ing a public offense; 
fr ) cons i s t s of an i tem or c o n s t i t u t e s evidence ol i l l e g a l cnducf . 
possessed by a pa r ty to the i l l e g a l conduct; 
( ) cons i s t s of an item or c o n s t i t u t e s evidence of i l l e g a l conduct, 
possessed by a person or e n t i t y not a pa r ty to the i l l e g a l 
conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code Annotated, 77-23-3(2)) 
. - j i i i *j« i dene e of th&0174 
PAGE TWO 
fcTTIDAVIT TOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The f a c t s to e s t a b l i s h the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: 
Tour a f f i a n t " D e t e c t i v e Zane S m i t h , H.Q1, i s employed by t h e S a l t Lake 
t v P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t , p r e s e n t l y a s s i g n e d t o t h e Metro N a r c o t i c s S t r i k e 
< c e . Your a f f i a n t h a s b e e n a p e a c e o f f i c e r f o r 5 y e a r s and i s c e r t i - / 7\ 
ed by t h e S t a t e U t a h a s a B e a c e O f f i c e r . Your a f f i a n t h a s been Riven [lj 
Le r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e n a r c o t i c s s a l e s and p o s s e s s i o n o f f e n s e s 
: c u r r i n ? i n S a l t " Lake County and t h e s u r r o u n d i n g a r e a s . 
--•»-«it>c i n t h e n a r c o t i c s i d e n t i f i c 
- - • A f f i a n t h* 
t e s p o n s i b i l i t C o u n t y a n a l d e B t i f i c a t i o n and i 
J u r r i t H i » S a l t « c P ^ ^ T i c e i n - S \ 
Has had t r a i n i n g i n « o f f e n s e s . ^ / ^ a t i o n t o * £ " ; , T o r c # C o ) 
>«* a f £ T i o n of « « c o t l c . r . U t j d
 o c c a . i o n . i *J H . r c o t i c . | J « £ \ h l . ^ 
: « 1 0 * ; ' i , ' s e r v e d numerous . t i , . t i < m « » « 
3f f e n s e s . 
. e s t i g a t i o n b e i n g ( f ) 
u A f f i a n t n a ^ 
. . _*«.»r r e 
' 4ra' s l a e s inv< 
jrmanti *°* 
°
n
 A . \ R o d r i g u e z , 
1
 _.IA from t h 
^;t-ai^'3" Sis- S ^ 
S U \ - J""*'1" »"" „d b a s f d e one ^ g ^ g ^ ^ 
r r a n t 
/ a f f i d a v i t 
• r v e 
^ § _ l i s t e j 
d e n t e r i n g . t h e n . 
e x j j 
During t h e 
t o 7 
— f f i a n r w£th__coca in5 ,
 R l „ a s 
VA s u r v e i l l a n ^ ' . ^ s t H T ^ t t ^ 6 P
 r T r t v h i l « . 
. . _ . . , . . „ s - d e f r o » I I « w i b e e n 
r\ r^ A *-*»#* 
PAGE THREE 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
J^/f i a n t has a l s o r e c e i v e d a copy of u | r i n t o u t i n which s u s p e c t OPHELIA 
js^ UFOR i s shown to be on probat ion for D i s t . Drugs For Value , a l s o a t tached. 
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t the Metro buji money l i s t e d on t h i s w a r r a n t / a f f i d a v i t 
w i l l s t i l l be on the premises . Based on a f f i a n t ' s t r a i n i n g and experience , 
a f f i a n t s b e l i e v e s s u s p e c t s keep cash on hand which i s f r u i t s of the ir crimes 
and i s used ro make change d u r i n g t r a n s a c t i o n s and fo maintains such an e n t e r -
p r i s e . 
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s that coc a ine and m a t e r i a l s fo r p a c k a g i n g c o c a i n e w i l l be 
found on the p r e m i s e s . On each o c c a s i o n s p e c i f i c amounts were asked for with 
out RI c o n t a c t i n g t h e suspect pr ior to a r r i v i n g at the premises l i s t e d . RI 
a l s o has t o l d your a f f i a n t that RI has o b s e r v e d pre-made b i n d l e s while i n s i d e 
t h e p r e m i s e s l i s t e d . RI has a l s o f JId your a f f i a n t t h a t suspeVt has s c a l e s 
i n s i d e t h e p r e m i s e s , ,our a f f i a n t r e c o g n i z e s s c a l e s as an i n h e r e n t Dart of a 
d rug s a l e s o p e r a t i o n , rhev a r e n e c e s s a r y t o mainta in and conduct such an 
o p e r a t i o n . 
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t the p remises shou ld a J s l e searched for n a r c o t i c s 
t r a n s a c t i o n s , r e c o r d s , p e r s o n a l n o t a t i o n s d e s c r i b i n g amounts s o l d , d a t e s 
s o l d , t o whom d rugs were sold and drug i n d e b t n e s s . Such r e c o r d s have been 
found
 ta 11 a k r i l l o c c a s i o n s where your a f f i a n t dnd o t h e r o f f i c e r s have 
s e r v e d n a r c o t i c s s e a r c h w a r r a n t s . A f f i a r ' b e l i e v e s from h i s expe r i ence and 
t r a i n i n g t h a t such r e c o r d ^ w i l l be p r e s e on t h e p r e m i s e s named r ^ - > 
r a r r a n t / a f f i d a v i t . 
RI has a l s o • a f f i a n t that RI has obsct eJ s j s n e c t BUFORD with 
what a p p e a r e c '•fl ^ 1 Smith and Wesson, as r e c e n t l y a two days <k 
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential informant 
re l i ab le because (if any information is obtained from an unnamed source.) 
/ o i A f f i d a v i t 
j 
!iour affiant has verified the above information from the confidential informant 
fn he correct and accurate through the following independent investigation: 
£RREE CONTINUED . 
KYXX Q? SEA^CB: VA-KMHT 
ur affiant vas attempting to complete the controlled buy. aforementioned 
% this varrant/affidavit on 1/4/89 at approximately 0025hrs at the address 
.isted on this warrant/affidavit* During the control buy your affiant vas 
monitoring the RI with body bug transmittor vhen your affiant and Det. 
DeWitt heard the RI call for help at least three times. Tour affiant also 
could hear vhat sounded like a male person attempt to direct the RI into 
- "^iti-on of the premises that the RI did not vant to go* Seconds later a sectron of the premises that the RI did not vant to go* Seconds lat 
your affi&nt and Det DeWitt could hear loud tumultuous banging sounds 
that affiant and Det DeWitt perceiy^ssa^an assault the RI* Entry vas 
by your affiant and Det DeWJL-^W^^^^trgf^: the safety of the RIf your 
affiant having knowledge of xf^apon 'otr enc^| hy nno isf PHP- enfip^p{e>nn 
made 
 _,
p
^r^trj yas-IDad-e a trd—ergj^ erpIT" 
(found in p l a i n view / a s , ^ 
Tain bedroom u p s t a i p > "Also your 
r t * 
bv one ftf r h p - f t n c p ^ ; g ^ n ^ f l 
L3G3 S e c u r e d — f ^ r n f f J r » r fiaf^fy 
a n i g h t s t a n d ins ide 
fj^anc observed in p l a i n v^ew two pipes 
which appeared to hav>a^been- usedjjwr^smoking c o c a i n e i n the satoe bedroom. 
Your a f f i a n t was unable to complete the c o n t r o l l e d buy that was mentioned 
e a r l i e r in t h i s w a r r a n t / a f f i d a v i t . 
C0177< 
i other v , 1 « " " 8 r t i = S « s ' • „ »nd «h»t« " 4 io-r ;^E %- °' ""l"-
 4 4»..«. —tat tnh.l»-«' 101 ia8
" 7 J..MX - - r . r a : ^ r . « ^ r ^ r ^ - •-•« -
-u^.si.K?S&ui1Jruu. — » ;a by._, .-
CpUrcha.«^ » < „ „ e . t i « . » « « ° " 7 
. . . M e t r o wax C u r r e t v c / , 
U
, * e r i a l U ^ 3 b e r , i 9 2 l 3 3 8 2 0 B 
S 1 0 0 . 0 0 . ,M516977A. 
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ADDENDUM B 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
FiL&fH&TSSST&ogEST 
Thi; d Judicial District 
AUJG 
Ddfcjjty Clerk 
in THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
AMI' I'liH NAM' LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE 'JTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
OPHELIA BUFORD, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINDINGS Or b*Cl, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 891900113 
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO 
This matter having been heard before this Court on August 
21 an -,-e.^ r. -. - ~ representee 
h~~ "ir. -;-,e- Bradshaw, esq., and 
t -:-i xuo counse lorgan, Deputy Salt Lake - -. 
Attorney and tevAe* 
memorandum .: • oi: ts • author IU'--. „D.,^ -• - ^v respec 
c - -• *:"''' consider c^ ^ - .*---ts preser - * being 
otherux^t . . . . s lis; 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 On ,Tann 
Narcotics Agents were monitoring ~. v- rsai.on ov«r .reless 
, 1',-f-M 11'( ,', M,? person of a then confidential 
G0210 
informant/ Yolanda Rodriguez who was attmepting to make an 
undercover purchase of cocaine from an individual later identified 
as Bobbie Roots. During the course of the transaction which was 
occurring at a residence at 474 North 740 West, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, Mr. Roots made unwelcome sexual advances towards Ms. 
Rodriguez which resulted in no less than three separate pleas for 
help to the agents. The narcotics agents called for bajzk up and 
determined to enter the residence when the cries for help were 
accompanied by a banging sound which one of the agents described as 
sounding as though Ms. Rodriguez had barricaded herself against a 
door and someone was trying to get in. 
2. Upon forcibly entering the residence, several narcotics 
agents dispersed throughout the three floors of the residence and 
secured several individuals. It was not until Bobbie Roots was 
apprehended with some amount of struggle in the lowest floor of the 
residence that Ms. Rodriguez finally was located in the bathroom on 
the main floor. On the upper floor of the residence, the defendant 
and several other individuals were observed along with numerous 
items of drug paraphernalia and what appeared to be a substantial 
amount of cocaine on a table. No items were moved or confiscated at 
that time nor was any more than a cursory search made for 
individuals who may have fled or posed a danger to the officers. 
3. Earlier that day, preparations for the affidavit in 
support of a search warrant had begun as a result of an "unwitting 
purchase of cocaine" by Ms. Rodriguez who had taken undercover Agent 
-2-
nn9.11 
zane smitn - residence she represented as ****• source of 
c nformation contained :! • affidavit was obtained 
from Ms* Rodriguez , othe u'tained Yy 
the State of Utah Bureau ir Criminal Identification/ Corrections, 
a The affidavit was tended encompass 
anticipated drug transaction inter , ,i 
Smith reviewed the affidavit, inserted additional information 
gleaned V oremise^ ---*,- ^ t-e 
affidavi ^ tne articipated drug transact 
T! le test-mony adduced duri^,: -*•. c-.i: ~ ** tY* suppression ~-a*^j~ 
shows that *n P •.-•-', 
transactions z . a^en p:ace witr: _ *;- person lat€. . :•. 
l idtuci ti defendant. 
Ka
 «earc> , ^  • .- - • signed 
- prrn - : ~a tel - ' ^i' ev^ -r.. -« - *-«^ . - :„ . -.. *-
result: - -.zui- * *-- scjghr 
Having entered its Findings t . = ^  , tJ-- ?~i;r*- "~T<T onfer<5 
its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
3 Exi gei it ci nances existed '-i~*-:.ry . the 
warrantless en t ry into ••. - >sidence, and 
observations made durinq ?.>..+ s e a r c : es idence : r . ~ / iduals 
was reas enable in: ider 1:1: :i aim uLoa Const i tut ions . 
3- • 
00212 
2. Under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit 
in support of the search warrant constituted probable cause to 
justify its issuance, and even if the source of the cocaine was 
erroneously identified, the error was neither willfully represented 
or made with reckless disregard for the truth, and the remainder of 
the affidavit amply supports the finding of probable cause* 
3. The warrant was executed in good faith reliance upon 
the authorization of the issuing magistrate which led to the items 
sought to be used against the defendant as evidence. 
Having entered its Conclusions of Law; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this ^ __~day of &*y/ 1990. 
/£(/£4sf 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
Third District Court Judge 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
this day of July, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM C 
r ! — ••:-> -GUtXT 
., «nn 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84311 
Telephone: 5 32-5444 
€Y . 
II I TI: II 2 D I S T R I C T " - u r Tnn T ' - - - - ? 
I N AND FOR SALT LAKE COUI JTX , L-'I'AT! "I 
DISTRICT 
1117,11 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v 
O P H E L I A M BUFORD, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 891900113 
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO 
3UFORD, r ;n: ~roug* 
s 
lat * . ;- jefendan ' ~ 
- *-*. - - r unreasonable 
( nMRa fjo' defendant * •-"> ' ± 
her attorney of rt 
Court to suppress all evider.-o seized 
HI dill, i- d i n II 
s e a r c h e s dod s e l z u ^> ,
 : ^ Amendme 
Sect ^- * 7' ~t i* *- c o n s t i t u t o r )efendant s p e c i f i c a l l y . . . ,-qt-
iuube v i o l a t e d ne i c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
riglr. - ^ , 
DATED t h i s / c-' du, . A? : : J - ~- -
rLS; : . ' - I V ^ubMl'I'iriLr, 
rJAMETS C. BRADSHAW 
A t t o r n e y fo r t h e ' 
co-'i-i;* 
